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The Arms Trade, Debt &
Development |
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Funding for the research was provided by the Trust
for Research and Education on the Arms Trade (TREAT)
Contents
Poverty
and Conflict | Military
Expenditure, Debt and Development Current
Military Expenditure Trends in Developing Countries | Arms
Sales Debt
& Conflict | The
Cost of Conflict | HIPC
Debt Initiative | Odious
Debt Post-Conflict
Societies and Debt
Development
Policy | The
UK Government and its Debtors | UK
Arms Trade Policy
SIERRA
LEONE | Economic
Performance & Development | UK
Policy KENYA
| Economic
Performance and Development | Security
INDONESIA
| Economic
Performance & Development | UK
Policy | Debt
& Arms Sales SOUTH
AFRICA | Economic
Performance & Development | The
UK’s role The
Rearmament of South Africa
Preface |
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This report highlights the inextricable links between war and
conflict on the one hand, and high levels of debt on the other.
Germany's high levels of First World War debt degraded her economy
and provided a breeding ground for militarism and fascism. Today a
similar pattern is repeated in the poorest countries. There is a
strong correlation between highly indebted countries and countries
which have descended into civil war and militarism.
High levels of indebtedness come about, in part, because
political elites in the poorest countries borrow recklessly for war.
Powerful creditors are equally reckless and compulsive in providing
loans to finance the purchase of weapons.
Just as Germany needed both debt relief and a Marshall Plan after
World War II, so do the poorest countries. Without debt relief these
countries cannot escape from the vicious cycle. The facts are
frightening. During the 1990s alone there have been 39 major
conflicts with more than 4 million people killed. Nine out of ten
casualties are civilians. There are over 200,000 child soldiers in
the world - a corruption of childhood which threatens all of our
futures.
In sub-Saharan Africa there are fourteen heavily indebted poor
countries involved in either a regional war or a civil conflict. The
cycle of debt and conflict has not been broken, and the role of the
west has frequently been to pour fuel on the flames of regional and
ethnic violence and instability. This report shows how major arms
exporters like the UK (in 1997 the second largest arms exporter in
the world) have supplied arms to oppressive regimes, and through the
Export Credits Guarantee Department (of the DTI) guaranteed the
loans used to buy them. It supports the Jubilee 2000 position that
loans made to corrupt dictators, such as those in Nigeria and
Indonesia, were made in the knowledge they would be misused or
corruptly diverted. Finally, it shows the meanness and
short-sightedness of creditors, whether they be the governments of
the G8 or the multilateral lenders of the IMF and World Bank, in
failing to provide the debt relief necessary to rebuild
‘post-conflict’ societies.
Jubilee 2000 is a global grass-roots movement calling for a
debt-free start to the millennium for over a billion of the world's
poorest people. Economic prosperity for all, not just the few, is
the best insurance against war and conflict. We call for a fair, and
transparent process to assess the debts. We want to ensure that
liability for bad loans and bad debts does not only rest with the
debtor. And we insist that organisations representing ordinary
people in the indebted nation should play a part in ensuring that
resources released by debt relief reach the poor. There are some
signs of progress on debt, and western governments are at last
beginning to look at codes of conduct for their export credit
departments, to place checks on taxpayer subsidies for arms dealers
and exporters. This is a start, but it needs to go much further.
Only then can we be sure of providing a more certain and secure
future for the millions suffering from the twin tragedies of debt
and war.
Introduction |
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Poverty is one of the root causes of violence. Many of the most
heavily indebted poor countries (HIPCs) in the world are currently
engaged in, or emerging from conflict. Protracted conflict
inevitably leads to highly militarised societies, reflected in above
average levels of military expenditures and large numbers of
combatants under arms.
Conflict provides lucrative markets for arms dealers, of both a
licit and illicit nature. In order to purchase arms poor countries
cut public expenditures in health and education and borrow foreign
exchange from international creditors. The poor become poorer and
conflict becomes more widespread. This sets up a vicious cycle of
debt, underdevelopment and conflict, which can only be broken if
radical action is taken by the international community to confront
the systemic nature of poverty and underdevelopment.
A fundamental starting point for comprehending these issues is to
explore the complexities of the damaging relationship between
poverty and conflict on the one hand, and the positive relationship
between sustainable development and security on the other. These are
the structural elements that contribute to the problem of debt and
underdevelopment. Arms transfers and militarism are the triggering
factors that exacerbate debt, poverty and conflict. These issues are
examined in detail in the first part of the paper. The second
section examines some of the existing contradictions in the UK’s
policies towards development, debt and the arms trade. The final
section provides case studies which explore the relationship between
development, debt and the arms trade in two HIPC countries - Sierra
Leone and Kenya, and two middle income countries - Indonesia and
South Africa.
Section I: Sustainable Development
and Security |
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The international community concerned with peace and security has
been slow to recognise the importance of sustainable development to
security, but as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has
observed ‘it is not possible for the community of nations to achieve
any of its major goals - not peace, not environmental protection,
not human rights or democratisation, not fertility reduction nor
social integration - except in the context of sustainable
development that leads to human security.3
Sustainable development is a wide-ranging concept referring to a
simultaneous improvement in the environmentally supportable economic
output of a country, the advancement of employment opportunities,
the promotion of social well-being and the eradication of poverty.
Sustainable human development as advocated by the UNDP is
intrinsically related to the creation of social stability by virtue
of the fact that it seeks to remove discriminatory factors within an
economy (sources of conflict) by providing opportunities for all
members of society to enrich their socio-economic potential.
Despite the significant development gains which have been made in
the last three decades there are still an estimated 1.3 billion
people who live in abject poverty, whose economic circumstances have
deteriorated over the last ten years.
According to the World Bank, the minimum requirement for a basic
standard of living is an annual income of $370 (‘$’ are ‘US$’ unless
otherwise indicated). In 1997 average per capita income in low
income countries in Sub-Saharan Africa was $350 per annum, life
expectancy at birth was 59 years, infant mortality was 78 per 1,000
live births and illiteracy was 47% of the population over the age of
15.4 The average annual growth of real gross domestic
product (GDP) in Sub-Saharan Africa - the poorest region in the
world - has fallen from 2.5% between 1985-1989 to 1.9% between
1990-1997.
Table 1: Average Annual % Rate of Growth In Selected Sub-Saharan
African Countries
|
1975-84 |
1985-89 |
1990-97 |
Angola |
- |
4.7 |
-1.6 |
Burundi |
3.8 |
5.1 |
-2.8 |
Cameroon |
8.5 |
-0.1 |
-0.9 |
Congo, Democratic Republic |
-0.3 |
1.7 |
-6.7 |
Ethiopia |
- |
4.1 |
3.5 |
Gambia |
4.3 |
3.3 |
2.4 |
Kenya |
4.7 |
5.9 |
2.1 |
Liberia |
0.1 |
-1.2 |
- |
Mozambique |
- |
6.0 |
4.2 |
Rwanda |
6.8 |
2.9 |
-5.5 |
Sierra Leone |
2.0 |
0.8 |
-3.3 |
Sudan |
2.6 |
0.9 |
- |
Zambia |
0.2 |
2.3 |
-0.4 |
The widespread economic collapse of many sub-Saharan states has
undermined the social cohesion of societies and exposed the
inability of the state to extend basic security to its citizens,
reflected in the widespread proliferation of humanitarian
emergencies and conflict on the continent. In many cases this has
led to the loss of political legitimacy and the subsequent collapse
of states. Collapsing states are defined by Zartman as ‘a situation
where the structure, authority (legitimate power), law, and
political order have fallen apart’.5 Throughout the
African continent, the collapse of states is reflected in a general
deterioration in central authority, a disintegration of social
cohesion, corruption, ethnic strife, widespread militarism, large
numbers of non-state actors under arms and the proliferation of
light weapons and intra-state conflict.
The enduring nature of conflict, debt and underdevelopment in
certain regions of the developing world can trace their origins to
the Cold War. At the height of bi-polar confrontation in the 1970s
and 1980s a number of the world’s poorest regions, such as Central
America, the Horn of Africa, Southern Africa and Indo-China, were
drawn into the superpowers’ wars of proxy. The escalation of
localised conflicts through superpower intervention led to rapid
regional militarisation, reflected in high levels of military
expenditures and conventional weapons’ proliferation. According to
World Bank figures, in 1985 Nicaragua allocated 26.2% of government
spending to military expenditures, Mozambique spent 38%, El Salvador
29.1%, Ethiopia 28.9%, Iran 34.1%. In most of these cases arms
purchases were a significant factor in placing upward pressure on
military expenditure budgets. With the end of the Cold War many of
these conflicts have been resolved, but the debt of war remains as a
debilitating factor inhibiting sustainable development and the
ability of these countries to establish a durable stability.
In most developing countries government revenues are
insufficiently elastic to be able to accommodate rising military
expenditures. In this situation a government has three options; it
can reallocate expenditures from other government expenditure
headings such as health and education; it can borrow foreign
exchange in the international financial markets; or it could do a
combination of these. In all three situations there is an
opportunity cost in terms of development.
Opportunity costs can be defined as the benefits foregone by
selecting one option at the expense of another or several others. In
a world where resources are scarce, choice implies sacrificing
something. The benefit that could have been derived from the
alternative, not chosen, is the opportunity cost of the option
actually selected.6
The UNDP has for some time utilised opportunity cost analysis in
an attempt to understand the effect of military expenditures on
sustainable development. In its Human Development Report 1994 it
argued that the allocation of scarce national resources to military
expenditures had incurred a huge loss of potential spending on human
development,7 observing that ‘some of the poorest African
countries now spend more on defence than they do on their
populations’ education and health.’
Military expenditure influences growth and development in a
number of direct and indirect ways.8 By redirecting
government expenditures away from education and health it has an
indirect effect on human capital formation. Excessive military
expenditure affects the balance of payments situation and levels of
infrastructural investment, while large purchases of military
equipment from foreign suppliers can distort the balance of trade
situation.
In general, measuring military expenditures in developing
countries is difficult, and in some cases impossible, because of the
general lack of transparency and accountability in government
accounting procedures and the resistance of authoritarian regimes to
revealing their military expenditure accounts. For instance in 1996
no African country reported its military expenditures to the UN
under the Reporting Military Expenditures programme. The IMF’s
latest audit of government finances, published in late 1997, gave
1996 figures on the military budgets of only Burundi, Madagascar,
Mauritius, Tunisia and Zambia.
Nevertheless, considerable effort has been made by organisations
such as the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) to
provide some sort of statistical account of military expenditure
trends within the developing world.9 According to the
IISS Military Balance in 1997 Sub-Saharan African expenditure was
$8.8bn, a slight increase over the 1996 level, and accounted for
around 3.3% of regional GDP.10 In Southern Africa and
East Africa military expenditure has been on the increase largely as
a result of recent acquisitions of weapon systems. Botswana’s 1998
security budget was $323m, accounting for 11.5% of government
expenditure. The armed forces accounted for about two thirds of the
budget, with the rest being allocated to policing expenditure.
Namibia’s 1998 military budget was N$443m ($89m), up from N$416m in
1997. Botswana and Namibia are involved in a border dispute over
Kasikili-Sedudu and Sintungu islands in the Caprivi strip of the
Linyanti-Chobe river, so their recent arms acquisitions have raised
concern within the region.
The Angolan government had an estimated budget of $380m in 1998,
about 10% of government spending, although final outlays will
probably be higher due to the continuing conflict with UNITA.
Military and police spending in Mozambique continues to decline,
although it still consumes 19.4% of government expenditure, down
from about 38% of government expenditure during the height of the
war in the 1980s.11 Zimbabwe’s military expenditure of
$456m in 1997/98 dramatically increased because of a one-off
disbursement of $210m to war veterans, and is certain to increase
because of its involvement in the Congo conflict.
Within the Southern African region, South Africa’s military
expenditure and budgets, at around R11bn ($1.9bn) for each of the
years 1996 to 1999, dwarfs all other military budgets. Current plans
to purchase $4.8bn worth of military equipment will reinforce its
overwhelming balance of military power within the region and
contribute to neighbouring countries’ growing concerns over South
Africa’s hegemonic intentions.
In East Africa, military expenditure continues to grow in Uganda,
which is engaged in war with the Democratic Republic of Congo and is
contending with guerrilla insurgency operations in the north of the
country. The 1998 budget was $153m, 26% higher than in 1997. In
Tanzania the combined military and police budget of $311m accounted
for 23% of the government budget. In Sudan, where civil war wages on
relentlessly, the military budget is thought to account for 80% of
government expenditure.
In addition to the formal military expenditures, there is a high
degree of off-budget funding of military activity in many
sub-Saharan African countries, most notably in the procurement of
military equipment and the funding and expenditures of armed
opposition groups and mercenaries.
In the Middle East and North Africa, regional military
expenditures increased between 1996-1997 by some 5% in real terms
despite declining oil revenues.12 At an average of 7%-8%
of GDP, the region continues to spend significantly more than any
other region of the developing world. Countries increasing their
military expenditure include Algeria, which is engaged in a vicious
civil war, Iran, where rising expenditure is covering a number of
expensively produced indigenous weapon systems and Saudi Arabia, UAE
and Qatar, which are all involved in importing expensive state of
the art weapon systems. Israel has a military budget of $7bn,
accounting for between 10%-12% of GDP, and is a major market for US
weapon systems. The region remains the largest and most lucrative
arms market in the world for sales of advanced weapon systems.
Regional arms deliveries in 1997 were estimated at $17bn.
Military spending in Central and South Asia showed a growth of 3%
in real terms in 1997, from $18.7bn in 1996 to $19.2bn in 1997.
India and Pakistan account for over 80% of regional military
expenditures. Military expenditure as a proportion of GDP was around
5% in 1997, higher than anywhere else except the Middle East.
In East Asia and Australasia military expenditures have been
significantly affected by the financial crisis and fell by about 5%
in real terms in 1997, from $149bn in 1996 to $142bn in 1997 (1997
prices). The depreciation of East Asian currencies against the
dollar increased the cost of foreign imports forcing some countries
to cancel orders for expensive weapon systems.
High levels of state and non-state military expenditure and the
purchase of arms have done little to enhance the security of the
majority of citizens in the developing world. Since 1945 more than
20 million people have died in wars and internal conflicts, a large
proportion of these in the developing world. The UNDP maintains that
‘countries spending very little on defence and much more on human
development have been much more successful at defending their
national sovereignty than those spending heavily on
arms’.13 By way of illustration it compares the
relatively peaceful experiences of Botswana, Costa Rica and
Mauritius with the conflicts afflicting Iraq, Myanmar and Somalia.
The reliability of data on arms sales to the world’s poorest
countries is even less conclusive than the information on military
expenditures. Since 1994, statistical records of most government to
government transfers of major conventional weapons are recorded by
the UN Register of Conventional Arms Transfers. Of the 44 countries
in Sub-Saharan Africa only Ethiopia, Mauritius, Namibia, Seychelles,
South Africa and Tanzania reported their arms transfers, military
holdings and domestic procurement to the UN Register on Conventional
Arms in 1997.
The figures below on the regional distribution of arms transfers
to the developing world produced by the IISS should only be taken as
trend indicators as much of the data available only provides a
partial picture of the actual scale of transfers.
|
1987 |
1997 |
|
($m) |
% of world market |
($m) |
% of world market |
Middle East/& N. Africa |
33,232 |
37.5 |
15,629 |
33.7 |
East Asia |
10,531 |
11.9 |
14,693 |
31.7 |
South Asia |
6,534 |
7.4 |
1,669 |
3.6 |
Latin America |
5,319 |
6.0 |
1,982 |
4.3 |
Sub-Saharan Africa |
6,791 |
7.7 |
991 |
2.1 |
Arms sales to Sub-Saharan Africa are particularly difficult to
quantify as the majority of transfers go unreported, particularly as
the categories of light weapons and ammunition, which constitute a
significant proportion of arms procurement in the region, are not
currently included in any of the existing data bases on arms
transfers. Light weapons and ammunition are supplied by local
industries as well as by international suppliers, but more
significantly there is a large trade in recycled weaponry from past
conflicts for personal use, as well as for use by statutory and
non-statutory forces. This latter form of trade is particularly hard
to track and thus to quantify. Under these conditions it is very
difficult, if not impossible, to measure in any statistical way the
scale of transfers into conflict zones in the developing world.
The main sources of supply for conventional arms are from a
handful of industrialised states which comprise the Permanent
Members of the UN Security Council - the US, France, UK, Russia,
China. In addition there are a number of newly industrialising
countries such as Israel, Brazil and South Africa which have become
recent entrants into the international arms market. Since the end of
the Cold War, a huge second hand market in weapon systems has also
emerged with large supplies coming from former Warsaw Pact
countries. Developing countries continue to be the primary focus of
foreign arms sales activity by the major weapons suppliers.
According to Grimmett, during the years 1989-1996 the value of arms
transfer agreements with developing nations comprised on average
67.5% of all such agreements worldwide.14 The value of
all arms transfer agreements with developing nations in 1996 was
some $19.4bn, which represented the first increase in arms sales
since 1992. In 1996 the United States was the biggest exporter,
having sales agreements worth $11.3bn, the UK with agreements worth
$4.8 was in second place, and Russia with sales agreements worth
$4.6bn ranked third.
The influence wielded by military industrial elites of the
supplier states and their drive to export, created by the need to
maintain employment in domestic military industries and generate
returns from large outlays incurred on domestic weapons procurement
projects, ensures that certain violent and repressive regimes such
as Indonesia, Nigeria and Pakistan have been able to acquire weapons
with relative ease. In part, these patterns of transfers derive from
patronage relations established during the Cold War which have
endured despite expectations of a new and positive world order.
Patronage not withstanding, a contradictory trend is discernible
amongst those Northern states which support the principles of
conflict prevention, development and good governance, yet place
little if any unilateral restraint on the export of arms to
developing countries. There are some signs that measures are being
taken to rectify this anomaly in the international community’s
dealings with post-conflict and conflict-prone societies. The recent
adoption of a ‘security first’ approach, for instance, is based on
the notion that security should no longer be considered discrete and
unrelated to other spheres of foreign policy, but should instead
form part of an integrated approach by donors.
One cannot conceive of an effective conflict prevention policy
that does not tackle the problem of arms supplies. At present no
multilateral system for controlling sources of supply of major
weapons systems exists, as there is for nuclear, chemical,
biological and intercontinental ballistic missiles. Even less
control exists for light weapons which have caused most of the
casualties in war in the developing world since the end of the Cold
War. Nevertheless there are a number of initiatives that are likely
to come to fruition in the next few years that may rectify this
hiatus.
Spurred on by the success of the global campaign to outlaw
anti-personnel mines which resulted in the signing of the Ottawa
Treaty in December 1997 by more than 120 states, a number of
interesting initiatives have been advanced with a view to
controlling the flow of light weapons. Support has been gaining
momentum for a convention on the prevention of the illegal use of
light weapons, aimed principally at establishing strict criteria to
govern the export, collection and destruction of surplus armaments
and at promoting more transparent international
co-operation.15 In this spirit the UN Panel of
Governmental Experts on Small Arms has recommended a number of
practical measures to reduce the quantity of weapons in circulation
and to curb future acquisitions of small arms, including
establishing a regional information-sharing network: providing
assistance for democratic internal security forces and assisting
post-conflict initiatives related to disarming and demobilising
regular and irregular forces.16
In May 1998, a UK-government-sponsored conference entitled
‘Developing Controls on Arms and Illicit Trafficking in Southern
Africa’ examined ways of developing a regional action plan for
Southern Africa, aimed at controlling light weapons proliferation
and diffusion. The programme is to be supported by the European
Union (EU). Other initiatives by the EU, including the establishment
in 1997 of its Programme for preventing and combating illicit
trafficking in conventional arms and the adoption of an EU Code of
Conduct in June 1998, are a step in the right direction. But it is
important to recognise that current initiatives remain inadequately
developed and in need of sufficient resources and greater
co-ordination at regional and international levels. In the coming
decade the challenge will be to enhance and empower these
initiatives so that they become the foundations of a new
multilateral arms control regime.
Sub-Saharan Africa may only account for a small share of the
global arms market but nowhere else is the relationship between
debt, development and the arms trade so stark. The profligate
policies of military regimes and the widespread proliferation of
conflict on the continent have contributed to a high incidence of
HIPCs on the continent. In fact 31 of a total of 41 HIPCs are
located on the African continent.
Moreover, of the countries identified by the World Bank as
HIPCs17 over half are involved in, or have recently
emerged from, conflict situations. Those countries currently engaged
in either interstate or intra-state conflicts include Angola,
Central African Republic, Chad, Republic of Congo-Brazzaville,
Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea,
Liberia, Sierra Leone, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. Note that
all of the above are located in sub-Saharan Africa.
Five countries - Burundi, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Rwanda, and
Yemen - are undergoing the fragile process of transition from war to
peace, while Vietnam and Lao are still suffering from the effects of
conflict which ended over 20 years ago, not least because of the
large presence of mines, which affects agricultural production and
the return of displaced peoples. Other severely indebted countries
such as Nigeria, Kenya and Myanmar are experiencing serious internal
instability. In other words, 23 of the 41 HIPC countries, that is
over half of the world’s poorest, most indebted countries are, or
have recently experienced conflict.
Many HIPCs are currently ruled, or have been ruled in the recent
past, by highly militarised, authoritarian regimes. These include
Bolivia, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of
Congo (formerly Zaire), Kenya, Liberia, Mali, Myanmar, Uganda and
Zambia. A report produced by Jubilee 2000, entitled Dictators and
Debt, has drawn attention to the fact that one fifth of all
developing country debt consists of loans that were given to
compliant dictators.18
The cost of conflict to development has been systematically
analysed in recent years.19 The economic consequences of
war are multiple and complex. They can be divided into immediate
human costs and the longer-term development costs. This division is
somewhat artificial because human costs such as the deterioration in
nutrition and education, the loss of life and depletion of skills
constitute development costs, while developmental costs such as
destroyed infrastructure and negative growth are among the causes of
human suffering and deprivation.
In Southern Africa the sustained costs incurred through the
destabilisation campaign waged by apartheid South Africa on its
neighbouring states has been estimated to total $115bn.20
With the end of the Cold War the Southern African region has
witnessed the withdrawal of superpower intervention, the end of
apartheid, the termination of conflict in Namibia and Mozambique, a
thirty percent decline in regional military expenditure and the
demobilisation of tens of thousands of soldiers. However, the debts
and cost of destruction that accumulated during the Cold War will
remain a burden for generations to come. Children not yet born will
have to pay the price of debt for wars they did not fight, for ideas
they do not hold, for a regional and global system that no longer
exists and for decisions made by regional and world leaders no
longer in power.
Conflict contributes to debt, but by the same token unsustainable
debt poses an ongoing and insidious threat to the well-being and
security of millions of people in the developing world. Scarce
national resources are siphoned away from poverty alleviation to
service debt, enriching the creditors of the affluent Western world.
At least 20 of the most heavily indebted poor countries (HIPCs)
transfer more than one-fifth of their revenues to creditors in the
developed world.
In 1995 Africa’s external debt amounted to $328bn of which
approximately 45% was owed to official bilateral sources, 30% to
official multilateral sources, and 25% to commercial lenders. In
order to service this debt fully, African countries paid Western
governments and external commercial lenders more than 60% ($86.3bn)
of the $142.3bn in revenues generated from their exports. In fact,
African countries paid more than 17% ($25.4bn) of their total export
earnings to these creditors, but this still left a total of $60.9bn
in unpaid arrears.21
In recognition of the unsustainability of the accumulated debt
burden of many poor countries, the World Bank and IMF launched the
HIPC Debt Initiative in 1996, which gave some hope to developing
countries that they might get some relief from their debt burdens.
The identified heavily indebted poor countries include those
countries which are unable to generate sufficient foreign exchange
through the export of commodities to be able to pay the interest on
their loans.
The main aim of the World Bank’s Debt Initiative for the HIPCs is
to bring a country’s debt burden to sustainable levels in terms of
debt to export earnings ratios, subject to satisfactory policy
performance, so as to ensure that adjustment and reform efforts are
not put at risk by continued high debt and debt service
burdens.22
So far the Debt Initiative has proved disappointing. Of the 41
countries identified as HIPCs, so far only three countries have
received debt relief, Uganda, Bolivia and Guyana. In all three
countries debt relief has been subject to meeting stringent
conditionalities imposed by the IMF over a six year qualifying
period. In development terms these countries have benefited very
little from the initiative, as debt relief has proved to be far too
little, far too late. In the case of Mozambique, for instance, which
qualifies for debt relief later this year, it will save only $11m on
a total debt service bill of more than $108m. Debt repayments will
continue to absorb more budgetary resources than health and primary
education combined. As Kevin Watkins of Oxfam’s Policy Unit has
observed ‘Defining such a state of affairs as ‘debt sustainability’
as the framework does, is as absurd in economic terms as it is
unacceptable in moral terms’.23
Critics of the HIPC Debt Initiative argue that the terms and
conditionalities that HIPCs are expected to meet are too stringent.
According to Jubilee 2000, ratios for measuring debt
unsustainability need to be lowered, made more realistic and brought
into line with historical precedents.24 Currently debt
sustainability is measured solely in terms of debt-to-export ratios
rather than in terms of budgetary burden. This reflects the IMF’s
insistence on prioritising monetary targets over human development
goals, contributing to reduced spending on health and education and
creating unemployment and increased levels of household poverty in
the process. In order to give some protection to poor countries’
development needs, Oxfam has argued for the introduction of a fiscal
cap into the debt relief framework, limiting debt repayments to 10%
of government revenues.
On a more progressive note, the IMF has introduced caps on
military expenditure levels since the end of the Cold War - an
initiative supported by the OECD (Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development) that has argued for the reallocation of
military savings to sustainable development goals.25 But
so far few savings from military budgets find their way into
development priorities, as the IMF insists on redirecting them
towards debt serving. This state of affairs makes a mockery of the
IMF and World Bank’s publicly-acclaimed commitment to strengthen the
linkages between debt relief, poverty reduction and conflict
prevention.
Kevin Watkins of Oxfam’s Policy Unit argues that instead of
insisting on compliance with IMF programmes, creditors should offer
pro-poor incentives for countries willing to transfer savings from
debt relief into schools, clinics and water supplies that will make
a qualitative difference to poor peoples’ lives.26 The
benefits of converting debt liabilities into investment for poverty
reduction are enormous. Not only would it create a platform for
social and economic recovery but it would create the conditions for
greater social and political stability.
The heavily indebted poor countries must accept some of the
responsibility for their present debt situation, but as UN Secretary
General Kofi Annan has argued ‘the international community needs to
acknowledge its own role in creating this problem. During the Cold
War bilateral and multilateral loans were often linked mainly to
geopolitical priorities, purchasing political peace and stability in
areas of interest to the super-powers or their principal allies. In
many cases bilateral loans provided funds for extensive military
expenditures by African countries. Across Africa, governments were
sometimes pressurised into accepting a wide range of loans which
they did not need and could not productively utilise. In many cases
little or no effort was made to ensure accountability for
expenditures, despite clear reasons for lenders to expect that
substantial sums were likely to be diverted or
misappropriated.’27
Since the end of the Cold War many former dictators have been
removed from power and replaced with democratically-elected
governments. The tragedy of this otherwise welcome development is
that the democratically-elected successors are expected to repay
those debts. As the Jubilee 2000 report points out, the lenders and
not the borrowers should be responsible for the loans to dictators.
There are two compelling reasons why these debts should be forgiven:
- First they are ‘odious debts’ as defined in international law,
and cannot be the responsibility of those who did not incur them
and who suffered as a result of those loans.28
- Second, there is the issue of ‘moral hazard’. By forcing
repayment of these loans, the international community signals an
acceptance of lending to corrupt and oppressive dictators. If
lending is to embody a level of integrity compliant with universal
norms then creditors must accept that such lending is morally
unacceptable and economically unsound.29
All too often the international financial community links the
issue of ‘moral hazard’ to debtor irresponsibility rather than
accepting its own share of responsibility for the build up of odious
debt. Currently, the IMF acting as a lender of last resort provides
a safety net for lenders against the high risks of lending to
authoritarian and corrupt regimes. This is the ultimate form of
‘moral hazard’ and one that has come under close scrutiny since the
advent of the East Asian financial crisis that has caused so much
suffering and instability throughout East Asia, but most
particularly in Indonesia. Only if lenders are forced to take the
full risks of their loans will the uneconomic nature of odious loans
be made apparent.
A classic case of odious debt and moral hazard is that of the
debts of apartheid. The apartheid regime is recognised throughout
the world to have denied basic human rights and to have used its
security forces for internal repression and external wars with
neighbouring states in Southern Africa. During the 1980s its
external debt accumulated as the society became increasingly
militarised. At the height of militarisation, South Africa
officially spent 5% of GDP on military expenditure. This did not
include sizeable hidden expenditures on its expensive nuclear
weapons programme and its chemical and biological warfare projects.
Since the end of the apartheid regime, South Africa has been at
peace with its neighbours, and its military expenditure has been cut
by over 50% since 1989, yet the debts incurred by the apartheid war
machine continue to undermine the alleviation of poverty in the new
South Africa.
The archbishop of Cape Town, Njongonkulu Ndungane, has made a
strong case for writing off the odious debts of the apartheid era,
‘as we approach the new millennium, the time has come to invoke the
Doctrine of Odious debt. In the case of South Africa, its foreign
and domestic debt was incurred, by and large under the apartheid
regime, and should be declared odious and written off.’
At the best of times, meeting the challenge of IMF and World Bank
economic reform and structural adjustment - a precondition for debt
relief - is onerous, but for those countries emerging from conflict
it is nigh on impossible. Kofi Annan has argued that ‘where a
country’s capacity to develop and implement a comprehensive
programme has been disrupted by conflict, consideration must be
given to relaxing the normally strict financial conditions imposed
by international lending institutions. Conflict prevention,
including post-conflict peace-building, may require an urgent
infusion of funds to support a fragile state during a delicate
political transition. It is particularly necessary to avoid
situations in which conditionalities are imposed that are
antithetical to a peace process, or in which international financial
institutions and the donor community cut off funds from a weak
government making, in good faith, a popularly-supported effort to
pursue reconciliation or implement peace agreements. Where economic
reform is needed it is necessary to consider how best to provide for
a peace-friendly structural adjustment programme while easing the
conditionality that normally accompanies multilateral
loans.’30
Post-war countries are faced with the immense task of
(re)integrating into the global world economy. Peace being settled,
they have to strive to become gradually able to compete effectively
in world markets and promote their interests in the economic and
trading system. This is more arduous now than it was decades ago, as
the process of world-wide liberalisation and technological progress
has accelerated. While many war-torn societies have fallen prey to
the internationalisation of criminal and purely speculative
activities, they are in a much more difficult situation to seize
potential benefits from the current global economic context,
commonly referred to as ‘globalisation’.
There is a strong case for debt forgiveness in post-conflict
societies to be linked to an insistence on fundamental political
change, i.e. a transition from authoritarian military rule to
democratic pluralism. In this vein Boyce and Pastor suggest that
external actors must formulate appropriate conditionalities if aid
is to support the peace process and attract or ‘crowd in’ domestic
resources for peace-related requirements.31 They argue
that in cases such as El Salvador, the international community
failed to exert effective peace conditionality but pressed
forcefully for macroeconomic reforms. In so doing the international
financial institutions weakened the consolidation of peace by being
both too rigorous on public expenditure reduction and not rigorous
enough on the reallocation of domestic resources from military to
the new democratic institutions. For these authors, the
reinforcement of power sharing and democracy is a priority in the
wake of a negotiated settlement to a civil war.
There is also a strong case for some sort of Marshall Plan
approach to economic reconstruction in post-conflict societies,
particularly where foreign intervention was responsible for the
escalation of militarism and conflict within a region.
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As a leading OECD economy with a strong presence in the UN
Security Council, the G8, the Paris Club and the EU, the UK
government is highly influential in setting the international
climate on issues concerning debt, development and the arms trade.
Although there have been many progressive reforms in certain aspects
of the UK’s foreign policies towards the developing world, as this
section attempts to show, there is a lack of coherence in the Labour
government’s current policies towards debt, development and the arms
trade.
In November 1997 the Department for International Development
(DfID) published the first White Paper on Development to be produced
by a UK government for 22 years. The White Paper defined DfID’s
central mission to support the internationally agreed target to
halve the proportion of the world’s population living in abject
poverty by the year 2015.
To achieve this goal, DfID quickly realised that it would have to
address one of the major obstacles to development, namely conflict
and the highly militarised regimes that dominate many of the world’s
poorest countries. The DfID Departmental Report 1999 states that ‘A
major obstacle to the eradication of poverty is the persistence of
violent conflict, or its legacy, in many of the poorest countries.
Reducing the incidence, duration and effect of armed conflict is
essential. DfID’s policy for conflict reduction seeks to strengthen
political and social systems to enable disputes and grievances to be
resolved without recourse to violence.’32
As part of this programme DfID has identified security sector
reform as a priority for its development agenda.33 Given
the controversial policies of the ODA (DfID’s former incarnation) in
supplying aid to sweeten arms trade deals, Clare Short, the
Secretary of State for International Development, has been emphatic
that no UK development assistance should be used to reinforce the
role of the military or support arms sales, ‘There is obviously no
question …of development resources being used to strengthen the
aggressive capability of military forces or being linked to arms
sales. Our interest is in helping to secure a security sector of
appropriate scale that is properly accountable to democratic,
civilian authorities.’34 A central objective of security
sector reform is to reallocate military resources to social need. In
the words of Clare Short ‘In too many countries, a bloated security
sector soaks up resources that would be better used elsewhere. And
resources spent on excessive procurement and perks for the military
mean the denial of essential public services for the
poor.’35
In pursuit of these objectives Clare Short has emphasised the
importance of co-ordinating DfID’s efforts with other government
programmes such as the Foreign and Commonwealth Office programme of
Assistance to Support Stability with In-Service Training (ASSIST)
and the Ministry of Defence’s (MoD’s) Defence Diplomacy Programme.
She stressed that ‘Co-operation is essential in this area of policy,
as in others such as trade or debt, to ensure that our Government’s
influence is used coherently in international affairs.’36
A problem that DfID is likely to encounter, however, is that the
coherence in international affairs so necessary to the success of
security sector reform simply does not exist between or even within
Whitehall departments.
The UK government has been at the forefront of arguing the need
for reform of the HIPC Initiative, and it has initiated debt
cancellation in a number of cases on a bilateral basis. Yet the UK
government has a track record of providing financial support to
facilitate arms sales to unsavoury regimes, and as yet this pattern
does not appear to have been altered.
More than one third of all debt owed to the UK government is owed
by Nigeria, which amounts to £3bn. Loans were extended to Nigeria
while it was under a military dictatorship. Sudan, which is fraught
with conflict, is the UK’s fourth largest debtor owing £382m. The
military regime in Algeria owes the UK £166m which was lent by the
UK after the results of the democratic election were annulled. The
Democratic Republic of Congo with its history of authoritarianism,
human rights violations, corruption and cronyism owes £134m to the
UK government.
A large percentage of UK bilateral debts have been incurred
through the Export Credits Guarantee Department (ECGD). The ECGD is
an independent department under the responsibility of the Secretary
of State for Trade and Industry. Its main function is to promote UK
exports abroad by guaranteeing payment to UK exporters in the case
of a default by foreign customers. It takes on risk that the private
sector is not prepared to accept. For the exporter this is an
insurance policy. If an importing country does not pay, then the
ECGD pays the supplier. A significant percentage of ECGD credit is
made available to underwrite UK arms exporters. Between 1994-97, 20%
of UK export credits were allocated to cover arms sales.
Many of the existing loans to unsavoury dictators were made under
the former Conservative administration whose foreign policy
practices came under considerable public scrutiny towards the end of
its term. On taking power Robin Cook, the Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs, announced a new mission statement for the Foreign
and Commonwealth Office which stated that ‘Our foreign policy must
have an ethical dimension and must support the demands of other
peoples for the democratic rights on which we insist for ourselves.
The Labour Government will put human rights at the heart of our
foreign policy’.37 Many areas of foreign policy are
undergoing a process of reform to reflect this new ethical
commitment, but in the area of the ECGD continuity rather than
change appears to characterise current practices.
Some of the most controversial ECGD decisions to have been made
under the Labour government are those to cover recent arms sales to
the incumbent Indonesian regime, currently facing financial crisis.
There are of course strong moral and ethical issues for not
exporting arms to Indonesia, which have been elaborated elsewhere.
But there are also strong reasons to question the sagacity of the
Labour government’s decision not to withdraw ECGD cover to Indonesia
given the endemic corruption within the former Suharto regime and
the Golkar Party which remains in power. A recent World Bank
internal document revealed the corruption which resulted in the
embezzlement of vast loans meant for Indonesian development since
1997. One third of the loans worth $24bn, intended for
infrastructure projects, disappeared into the pockets of the Suharto
regime.38 By extending cover to the current regime the UK
government confers a high degree of legitimacy on a regime with a
track record of heavy-handed militarism, corruption and human rights
abuse, and which does not conform to DfID’s policies on conflict
resolution, humanitarian assistance and development.
Nowhere is the contradiction between the UK government’s
development goals and foreign policy objectives more at odds than in
its arms trade policy. In July 1997 Robin Cook committed the FCO to
a ‘responsible’ arms trade policy.39 He pledged to
introduce tougher restrictions on arms exports and to play a
constructive and leading role in pressing for a European Code of
Conduct on arms exports.
In theory at least, the Labour government has committed itself to
restricting the sale of weapons to regimes that might use them for
internal repression or external aggression, and is attempting to
increase accountability and transparency in decisions on export
licences. In addition the government has undertaken to reform
existing legislation on strategic export controls and was
instrumental in setting up the EU Code of Conduct which includes a
set of eight Common Criteria for Arms Exports that EU governments
must take into consideration. One of these is ‘the respect of human
rights in the country of final destination’.
Complementing the Foreign Office’s ‘ethical policy’ on the arms
trade, DfID has adopted a policy which links the arms trade to
development. In its 1999 Departmental Report it has categorically
recognised the relationship between arms supplies and conflict: ‘The
supply of weapons, particularly small arms, continues to fan the
flames of conflict. In parallel with the FCO’s work on developing a
Code of Conduct for Arms Exports, we have tried to help developing
countries and regions deal with the problem of illicit trafficking.
We have supported seminars in central and Southern Africa to agree
measures for tackling arms proliferation’.40
In reality, however, the improvements in the government’s
unilateral and multilateral approaches to arms control appear to
have done little to stem the flow of weapons systems to developing
countries. According to IISS estimates, the arms trade grew by some
12% in 1997, bringing real growth between 1995 and 1997 to some 36%.
In 1994 the UK exported $5bn worth of arms, by 1997 this had
increased to $8bn. This contrasts with the general decline in arms
export values that were sustained from 1987 to the early 1990s. The
UK was the second largest exporter of arms in 1997, accounting for
18.5% of the global market and has in no small way contributed to
the growth in arms deliveries particularly to the developing world.
The surge in arms exports reflects deliveries to the Gulf States
- particularly Saudi Arabia’s $11bn military imports which included
the delivery of 36 Tornados and 20 Hawk trainer aircraft built by
British Aerospace. Arms deliveries to East Asia also peaked in 1997.
Whether primarily pursuing geostrategic interests or propelled by
the profit motive, as a supplier state the UK has indirectly
supported highly militarised regimes such as the Suharto regime in
Indonesia, the Saudi family in Saudi Arabia, the military
dictatorship in Nigeria. All these countries have been condemned for
human rights abuses by Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International.
Apart from conferring a high degree of political legitimisation
to these repressive regimes, UK arms sales encourage regimes to
spend scarce national resources on weapon systems rather than on
development objectives. In this way arms sales promoted by the
Defence Export Services Organisation of the MoD undermine the
development objectives of DfID. Detailed illustration of the
contradiction in the government’s policy towards arms transfers,
debt and development are to be found in their policies towards to
Sierra Leone, Kenya, Indonesia and South Africa.
Section III: Case Studies
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The four case studies that have been chosen have been selected to
reflect a broad spectrum of developing countries facing diverse
debt, development and security challenges. They are all countries
that the UK has recently transferred arms to. In the case of Sierra
Leone, a poor war-torn society with HIPC status, the UK government
has been implicated in supporting the illicit transfer of small
arms, in the case of Kenya, also a HIPC economy, the UK has recently
exported riot control equipment. In both these cases, weapons
transfers are relatively small in terms of value, but have
significant political and development implications. In the cases of
Indonesia and South Africa the weapons being transferred are major
weapon systems and the values are much more significant. These two
countries are more highly developed than the first two, but face
severe debt, development and internal security problems. The
differing individual experiences of each country reflect the complex
interaction of development, debt and arms transfers.
Sierra Leone is a small highly indebted, impoverished and war
torn West Africa state with a population of 4.7 million. In 1997 the
World Bank estimated that it had a GDP of only $0.76bn and a total
debt to GDP ratio of 164.6%. The World Bank recognises Sierra Leone
as a heavily indebted poor country.
The civil war in Sierra Leone began in 1991 when the
Revolutionary Unified Front (RUF), supported by Liberia, overthrew
the then President and imposed military rule in 1992. Following
considerable international pressure to reinstate democracy,
elections were held on March 29th 1996 which gave the Sierra Leone
Peoples Party (SLPP) headed by Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, 60% of the
popular vote.
The principal rebel group (RUF) signed a peace agreement with the
new government, but in May 1997 the RUF backed a military coup led
by Major General Paul Koroma. President Kabbah fled to Conakry in
Guinea. The international community was determined to dislodge the
illegal junta from power. To this end neighbouring African states
and the United Nations imposed sanctions including an embargo on the
supply of arms and military related equipment. The UN arms embargo
required Member States to ‘prohibit the supply of arms to any person
or legal entity, for the purpose of any business carried out in or
operated from the Republic of Sierra Leone, or any activities by
their nationals or in their territories which promote or are
calculated to promote such sale or supply’.
In 1993 the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
had sent a mainly Nigerian force known as ECOMOG to help suppress
the rebels. Nigerian troops were still in the country when, in
February 1998, after a week of intense fighting, they recaptured the
capital Freetown from the junta. The return of President Kabbah did
not bring the violence to an end, however. The RUF nearly captured
Freetown in December 1998 and still control more than half the
country. Horrific violations of human rights have been committed by
both sides in this destructive and persistent war.
Sierra Leone is a desperately poor country. In 1996 its gross
national product (GNP) per capita was $200 and male life expectancy
was 37 years. Since then the economy has deteriorated dramatically
because of the effect of the war. According to World Bank figures
GDP growth declined by 21.1% in 1997 and per capita income declined
by 23.1%.41 A quick glance at the figures below will
reveal a process of dramatic decline in exports, a depletion of
national savings and growing current account deficit and a dramatic
increase in debt since the 1970s.
Key Economic Indicators |
1976 |
1986 |
1996 |
1997 |
GDP, $bn |
0.67 |
0.41 |
0.86 |
0.76 |
Exports/GDP |
26.6 |
19.8 |
11.8 |
11.3 |
Gross domestic savings/GDP |
5.4 |
8.2 |
-11.3 |
-10.3 |
Current account balance/GDP |
-13.3 |
-10.8 |
-18.0 |
-21.2 |
Interest payments/GDP |
0.8 |
0.5 |
1.6 |
1.6 |
Total debt/GDP |
28.4 |
210.6 |
134.4 |
164.6 |
Total debt service/exports |
16.9 |
32.7 |
61.0 |
46.4 |
|
Population, millions |
4.7 |
Population growth, annual % |
2.5 |
Life expectancy at birth |
38 |
Infant mortality per 1,000 live births |
169 |
Child malnutrition, % children under 5 |
29 |
Illiteracy, % of population age 15+ |
69 |
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These somewhat depressing indicators of poverty and economic
decline disguise the fact that Sierra Leone is one of the world’s
principal diamond producers. The diamond mines have attracted many
foreigners with an eye to quick profits, and they are at the root of
the internal struggle for power.42 The diamond trade has
also attracted a considerable mercenary presence in the country who
insist on payment in lucrative mining concessions.
Since the fighting resumed in 1997, the economic situation has
deteriorated as civil war has wreaked destruction and chaos across
the country. The social disruption and the economic costs of war
have been enormous. The conflict has claimed the lives of an
estimated 10,000 citizens, over two million people have been
internally displaced and a further 450,000 are refugees in
neighbouring countries. Substantial damage has been caused to the
productive sectors, in particular agriculture and mining, thereby
greatly reducing the government’s revenue earning capacity.
Significant infrastructure has been destroyed or has deteriorated
due to the lack of maintenance, and the delivery of basic social
services has largely ceased.
The violence and destruction in Sierra Leone during 1998-99 has
been relentless. According to a report released from Refugee
International in March 1999, between 65% to 85% of the capital,
Freetown, has been destroyed. More than half the internally
displaced are cut off from international assistance because of the
fighting.
By April 1999 the humanitarian crisis in Sierra Leone was
catastrophic, at least equal to the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo.
In April 1999 The World Food Programme warned of an imminent food
crisis and of insufficient medical aid even to treat the ever
growing number of amputees. Apart from the internally displaced
there are some 95,000 refugees in neighbouring Liberia and
approximately 350,000 Sierra Leonean refugees in Guinea. Refugees
fleeing into Guinea have not necessarily found sanctuary from rebel
violence - in March rebel troops raided the Guinean town of Pamelap
where 5,000 refugees had fled.
Sierra Leone has been an independent member of the British
Commonwealth since 1961 and has long standing links with the UK. The
UK government contributed £2m to fund the election which put
President Kabbah in office. Since then the UK has provided bilateral
aid to support projects that nurture democracy and the rule of law
and that provide humanitarian aid to the poor.
After the military coup in 1997 the UK government announced that
their policy was to support the peaceful restoration of President
Kabbah’s democratically elected government. However, as the Legg
report has revealed the UK government played a highly controversial
and clandestine role in the Sierra Leonean crisis.43
The Legg report found that certain Foreign Office officials
actively supported the role of the mercenary organisation, Sandline,
in overthrowing the military junta. Sandline, who describe
themselves as ‘military consultants’, were reported to have bought
£6m worth of arms in Bulgaria to supply Mr Kabbah’s forces in a
counter-coup in 1998, with the implicit blessing of the UK
government.44 The arms supplied by Sandline were destined
for the Kamajors, a tribal militia who are among Mr Kabbah’s most
loyal supporters and sworn enemies of the RUF. In the event, the
military action planned by Sandline in collusion with the Kamajors
was pre-empted by the military intervention of the ECOMOG forces.
Sandline’s arms purchases were conducted in the full knowledge of
certain Foreign Office officials and the High Commissioner of Sierra
Leone, Mr Penfold. The Legg report found that no Ministers gave
encouragement or approval to Sandline’s plans to ship arms to Sierra
Leone.45
In its defence, the Labour government argued that it took the
moral high ground in the crisis in Sierra Leone by helping to
re-establishing the rightful and democratically-elected government,
but many ambiguities remain about the UK’s role in the crisis.
Following the findings of the Legg Inquiry, public debate on the
UK’s role in Sierra Leone focused mainly on legal and procedural
matters – i.e. to what extent did UK officials collude in the breach
of a UN embargo.46 In terms of reform, focus has been
placed on the banning of arms brokerage. While this is a welcome
development for those concerned with stemming the supply of light
weapons, insufficient attention has been given to the more
substantial issue about the willingness to engage and arm irregular
forces and what this means for long-term political stability and
sustainable development.47
Meddling in the affairs of another country through clandestine
means sets a dubious and problematic precedent, particularly when
the supply of illegal arms are involved and where military
operations are sub-contracted to mercenary groups. Recent African
history, such as the war in Angola, shows us that the use of
mercenaries and the provision of arms encourages elites to seek
military rather than diplomatic or political solutions to conflict
resolution. It reinforces a winner takes all approach to political
power which is at the root of the problems of income inequality and
corruption in Africa.48 There are few, if any, cases
where mercenaries have been used and conflict has been resolved. Yet
the influence of mercenary groups on conflict and development is
harmful and expanding. National resources such as diamond and other
mining concessions handed over to mercenary groups in exchange for
their services represents a loss of development potential and a loss
of control over national resources. Such rich rewards provide little
if any incentive to mercenary groups to bring conflict to a close.
In many cases, the relationship between mercenary groups and
military and political elites is corrupt and the clandestine nature
of their operations undermines the principle of transparency and
accountability in security sector activity.
Finally, as mentioned by Tony Lloyd (UK Foreign Minister),
dealing with mercenaries can have an adverse impact on the
implementation of the government’s foreign policy objectives and its
standing in international circles.49 This observation
also applies to support for the clandestine supply of arms. For
example in an article in Sierra Leone’s national newspaper The
Progress, on the 9th April 1999, the UK’s role in the crisis and in
particular the supply of arms to ECOMOG have been questioned, ‘We
believe that providing more arms and ammunition to ECOMOG to fight
the rebels will all go on to prolong what seems to be a seemingly
unending nightmare. In fact providing more arms to ECOMOG may also
mean indirectly providing arms to the rebels since the possibility
for arms reaching the rebels is likely’50. The article
then goes on to cite an incident in which the RUF ambushed and
captured a large consignment of arms destined for ECOMOG.
The article also raises the important question of the UK’s
funding priorities in seeking to fund a solution to the civil war;
‘Britain like other members of the international community claim
that they support the two-track approach forwarded by the
government. Now if Britain is honest in her support for this
approach, how many pounds has she donated towards solving the crisis
peacefully rather than (through) the use of force’.51 So
far UK actions far from improving the situation have, if anything,
helped to escalate the conflict and the UK’s role in it. Meanwhile
the victims of the conflict have been all but ignored by the
international community.
Kenya was a British colony and protectorate from the 1890s until
independence in December 1963. It is a member of the British
Commonwealth and has enjoyed close relations with the UK since
independence.
Jomo Kenyatta transformed Kenya into a de facto one party state
centred on the Kenya Africa National Union (KANU) party which has
dominated Kenyan politics ever since. The current President, Daniel
Arap Moi, succeeded Kenyatta in 1973. In 1992, under international
pressure, more parties were allowed to form and take part in
national elections. Nevertheless KANU sustained election victories
in 1992 and 1997 amidst considerable controversy about election
rigging and localised violence.
In 1997 Kenya had a population of 28 million and a GDP of
$10.2bn. GNP per capita is $330 per annum. Kenya has a relatively
diversified economy but most employment is dependent on agriculture
which contributes 29% of GDP. Kenya enjoyed steady economic growth
from independence until the late 1970s. The average GDP growth rate
has declined from 6.5% in the 1970s to 2.2% in 1990-97, below the
rate of population growth at 2.6%. The Kenyan economy was badly
affected by the oil crises in 1973 and 1979. Following these
external shocks Kenya began to descend into debt. Kenya’s foreign
debt is high, amounting to 63.4% of GDP in 1997, although debt
servicing, at 28% of foreign exchange receipts, is fairly low by
Sub-Saharan standards. This is because a large proportion of Kenya’s
debts are domestic debt. Interest payments on domestic debt are,
however, a serious burden accounting for 25% of government revenues.
Key Economic Indicators |
1976 |
1986 |
1996 |
1997 |
GDP, $bn |
3.5 |
7.2 |
9.2 |
10.2 |
Exports/GDP |
32.5 |
25.8 |
32.9 |
29.2 |
Current account balance/GDP |
-3.6 |
-6.6 |
-2.4 |
-3.3 |
Interest payments/GDP |
1.5 |
2.6 |
2.6 |
1.8 |
Total debt/GDP |
43.0 |
63.4 |
74.4 |
63.4 |
Total debt service/exports |
14.8 |
36.1 |
28.0 |
19.7 |
|
Population, millions |
28 |
GNP per capita, $ |
330 |
Population growth, annual % |
2.6 |
Poverty, % of pop below poverty line |
42 |
Life expectancy at birth |
58 |
Infant mortality per 1,000 live births |
56 |
Child malnutrition, % children under 5 |
23 |
Illiteracy, % of population age 15+ |
22 |
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In the early 1980s, Kenya had distinctly more favourable social
indicators than most countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. But, as the
country’s economic performance began to deteriorate, sustained per
capita income growth became an elusive goal. By the early 1990s
social indicators began to show that gains made in poverty
eradication were in reverse. In certain regions of the country child
malnutrition is on the rise. Some 47% of the rural population remain
in poverty and experience chronic food insecurity. Furthermore, the
difference between the minimum required consumption and the actual
consumption of the poor has increased and the distribution of
consumption has worsened.
In the 1980s Kenya was among the major aid recipients in Africa,
but the 1990s have witnessed a steady decline in development
assistance, occasioned by a perception of poor governance and
mismanagement of public resources and development assistance by the
Moi regime.
By African standards Kenya is not a highly militarised state. In
1997, military expenditure amounted to $198m or 1.9% of GDP and
remains lower than state expenditure on education. There are,
however, some alarming trends within Kenya which should raise
concerns for those concerned with conflict prevention.
The Moi regime, in conjunction with the Belgium company Fabrique
Nationale Herstal, has built a £6m munitions factory which was
completed in 1997. The factory is reputed to have supplied arms to
Rwanda in violation of the UN arms embargo. This development has
given rise to concerns about Kenya’s role in light weapons
proliferation in the Great Lakes region. Moreover this investment
has been made despite the fact that Kenya is experiencing a
deteriorating economic situation.
Kenya is also facing a deteriorating internal security situation.
There are for instance low intensity ethnic conflicts involving the
Turkana and Samburu peoples in the north. Ethnic clashes in the
early 1990s resulted in hundreds of dead and thousands being
displaced. There are also reliable reports of widespread human
rights violations committed by the police on behalf of the
increasingly isolated and ruthless Moi regime. Political opposition
to the Moi regime has been growing and during the 1997 general
election there was violent political conflict in Mombasa.
Despite Kenya’s growing internal instability and the
authoritarian nature of the Moi regime, the UK has exported military
equipment to Kenya, albeit in small quantities by UK export
standards. Between January 1992 and January 1998, 380 standard
individual licences were issued for the export to end users in Kenya
of goods described under the Export Control Organisation’s Military
List, including licences for tear gas and plastic baton
rounds.52 Since the Labour administration has come to
power it has attempted to tighten restrictions in line with the
criteria set out by the Foreign Secretary in July 1997. Under these
criteria equipment that might be used for internal repression is
restricted. In 1997 the government rejected applications for
licences for riot control equipment worth an estimated £1.5m. In
addition the government has removed Kenya from the coverage of
several Open Individual Export Licences.53
The Moi regime is unlikely to last long into the next century,
yet there is no guarantee that there will be a smooth transition
from a one party state to a functioning democracy. Even if democracy
does assert itself, it will face a legacy of debt that will restrict
the ability of the government to implement a sustainable development
programme that will reverse the deteriorating social conditions and
rising poverty. The failure to address poverty and the growing
inequalities that have come to characterise the Kenyan economy in
recent times will exacerbate the underlying tensions within Kenyan
society. The early warning signs of impending conflict are visible
to those that want to see. Now is the time to take action on debt
and development assistance to prevent the sort of humanitarian
crisis that has become all too common on the African continent. It
is also time to remain vigilant on arms sales restrictions to Kenya
to prevent the flow of arms which will only act to intensify the
potential levels of conflict and human rights abuses.
Indonesia with a population of 200 million is the fourth largest
country in the world. It is a middle-income developing country with
a GNP per capita income of $1,080 in 1996. However, within the space
of a year, from 1997 to 98, the Indonesian economy contracted
rapidly due to the effects of the East Asian financial crisis. In
1998 after years of successful poverty eradication the proportion of
population in extreme poverty was estimated to be 16.3% and rising.
For over 35 years Indonesia was ruled by the corrupt and
authoritarian Suharto regime which relied upon the military to
impose social order through brutal and repressive means. Despite the
widespread repression and corruption the Indonesian economy grew at
a healthy and sustained rate for over two decades and great strides
were made in reducing the levels of poverty and income inequality
within Indonesian society. While economic conditions remained
buoyant the malpractices of the Suharto regime were tolerated. The
economic crisis which began in 1997 has however, dramatically
transformed the political climate. The economic hardship tearing at
the fabric of society, caused people to protest and increasingly
riot against the corruption, cronyism and nepotism of the Suharto
regime.54 In the face of mounting opposition and
political turmoil Suharto resigned in May 1998. Dr. Habibie,
Suharto’s right-hand-man, now presides over a regime that remains
military-dominated, undemocratic and repressive, and continues to
commit atrocities in East Timor, Aceh and Irian Jaya. The death toll
from the widespread violence rises every week. Indonesia’s chaotic
internal political situation shows little sign of stabilising at the
time of writing in May 1999.
Before late 1997, Indonesia was a middle income country. Its
extraordinary progress in poverty reduction from 60 percent of the
population in the 1960s to 15 percent in 1996 has been
well-documented. Gains in the health and education sectors were
equally remarkable and much progress was made in improving the
gender gap. These gains are now in jeopardy as the socio-economic
effects of the East Asian financial crisis takes their toll.
Key Economic Indicators |
1976 |
1986 |
1996 |
1997 |
GDP, $bn |
39.3 |
79.9 |
227.4 |
214.6 |
Exports/GDP |
24.5 |
20.2 |
25.8 |
28.1 |
Current account balance/GDP |
? |
? |
-3.5 |
-1.2 |
Interest payments/GDP |
1.2 |
3.0 |
2.2 |
2.7 |
Total debt/GDP |
35.6 |
53.7 |
56.7 |
64.3 |
Total debt service/exports |
- |
- |
35.5 |
- |
|
Population, millions |
200.1 |
GNP per capita, $ |
$ 1,110 |
Population growth, annual % |
1.6 |
Poverty, % of pop below poverty line |
15 |
Life expectancy at birth |
65 |
Infant mortality per 1,000 live births |
47 |
Child malnutrition, % children under 5 |
40 |
Illiteracy, % of population age 15+ |
16 |
|
The Indonesian economy with its underdeveloped banking sector
and its high degree of speculative foreign investment was highly
susceptible to the flight of capital that spread across East Asia in
the second half of 1997. Years of development gains were wiped out
in a matter of weeks as the local currency, the rupiah, lost 80% of
its value against the dollar and inflation soared to over 50%. The
Indonesian stock market lost 50% of its value. The economy which had
sustained high rates of economic growth for decades contracted by
ten to fifteen percent. The crisis hit Indonesia when it was
experiencing its worst drought in fifty years, and the international
oil price was registering a sharp decline.
Overnight Indonesia became a heavily indebted nation. Estimates
put non-performing loans from domestic banks at more than 30 per
cent of GDP in Indonesia. To this must be added an overhang of
unpayable external debt, estimated at $22bn.55 The
situation in Indonesia is not just a financial and economic crisis
but a human one - with the well-being of many millions of people at
stake. Rampant unemployment and inflation have pushed literally
millions of households back into poverty. In 1996 some 4.5 million
people were already unemployed but, due to the effects of the
crisis, official estimates suggest that an additional 10 million had
lost their jobs by early 1999, although many may have moved into
low-paying urban and rural informal sector work rather than open
unemployment. School attendance and health are under threat, and the
gender gap appears to be widening again. The economic crisis has hit
households hard through sharp price shifts and a public spending
squeeze. Food security has become a major concern as dramatic price
increases for basic foodstuffs affect consumption and nutritional
patterns - particularly for women and children.
The IMF bailed out Indonesia to the tune of $43bn to help
stabilise its foreign exchange situation and has insisted on a
stringent programme of economic reforms. Initially, Fund officials
and the US Treasury were confident that macro-economic stability
would return as long as the Indonesian government complied with the
IMF’s reform programme.56 But it soon became apparent
even to the IMF that macro-economic stability depended upon
political stability.
Characteristically the IMF displayed complete insensitivity to
the socio-economic situation of the Indonesian people by insisting
on cuts of government food and fuel subsidies. This had the effect
of intensifying the level of riots and demonstrations. In May 1998
the IMF reluctantly adjusted its reform programme to take account of
the political and social fragility of Indonesian society. In tandem,
the World Bank has implemented a social safety net programme to
ameliorate the worst effects of the economic crisis.
The economic and political prospects for Indonesia are sobering.
Output in 1998 is estimated to have declined by 15%. Given the depth
of the crisis, the economy will face ongoing challenges to foster
employment and income generating activities for many years to come.
While the economy remains in crisis the opportunity for political
stabilisation remains remote.
Currently the UK government’s policy towards Indonesia lacks
cohesiveness, reflecting the divided interests of the different
departments within Whitehall.
Traditionally DfID has refused bilateral support to the
Indonesian government because of its poor human rights record.
However, the social impact of the financial crisis has caused DfID
to reconsider its position towards poverty alleviation in the
country. Funding has been allocated to the Community Recovery
Programme, a social safety-net programme established by Indonesian
civil society. It is also working with the World Bank in the area of
health sector finance to help ensure that the IMF structural reform
measures do not overlook the needs of the most vulnerable. In
addition DfID is providing support to a UNICEF infant feeding
programme in West Java.57 In total, bilateral funding for
Indonesian development projects amounted to £7.1m in 1998/99 and is
planned to increase to £10m in 2001/02.58
In marked contrast to DfID’s principled position, the Defence
Export Services Organisation of the Ministry of Defence has to all
intents and purposes ignored Indonesia’s deteriorating economic,
social and political circumstances by ruthlessly pursuing arms sales
to Indonesia. The decision to sell arms to Indonesia has raised many
questions about the strength of the Labour government’s commitment
to its ethical foreign policy and indeed about its commitment to
sustainable development and conflict prevention.59
The UK has been selling arms to Indonesia for over two decades.
British Aerospace began to sell Hawk jets in 1978. In November 1996,
amidst considerably public controversy due to the deteriorating
political and human rights situation in East Timor, 16 more Hawk-209
aircraft were licensed for export to Indonesia. The Conservative
government at the time argued that they were not ‘likely’ to be used
for internal repression and repeatedly denied that there was
substantial evidence that Hawks had ever been used against people in
East Timor or Indonesia. The licence was extant but not used when
the Labour government came to power.
On 28th July 1997, within three months of announcing ‘an ethical
foreign policy with human rights at its heart’, the Labour
government confirmed that it would not revoke the licences for the
sale of the Hawks, or for water cannon and Scorpion armoured cars.
This decision was made despite calls by international human rights
organisations to refrain from supplying arms to the Suharto regime
because of its persistent pattern of human rights violations and its
occupation of East Timor.60
Defending his decision to transfer arms to Indonesia, Cook said
that the contracts agreed to under the previous Conservative
administration were legally binding and therefore had to be
honoured. It is highly doubtful that if the Labour government chose
to revoke the licences to Indonesia it would be liable to pay
compensation to the UK manufacturers. Article 7(1) of the Export of
Goods (Control) Order 1994 states a licence ‘may be varied or
revoked by the Secretary of State at any time’. Assuming therefore
there is no guarantee in the licences about duration or compensation
(it would be remarkable if there was), there is no liability
incurred by the government if it decided to revoke the Indonesia
licences. Moreover, precedents exist for revoking licences as in the
cases of Iraq, Somalia, and Yugoslavia. These decisions have not
resulted in the UK government facing compensation claims.
One suspects that the real explanation for transferring arms to
Indonesia relate to the commercial interests of the UK’s most
powerful lobbying force, namely the UK’s military industrial base. A
caveat has been built into the Criteria Used in Considering
Conventional Arms Export License Applications, which allows
commercial criteria to be placed above ethical considerations in the
government’s new arms trade policy, captured in the statement; ‘full
weight should be given to the UK’s national interests when
considering applications for licenses, including:.....the protection
of the UK’s essential strategic industrial base.’61 In
recent years Indonesia purchased 60% of its arms imports from the
UK. As a result, Indonesia has been identified as one of the most
lucrative East Asian arms export markets for UK
companies.62 The current economic and political crisis in
Indonesia has done nothing to dampen the Labour governments resolve
to sell arms to the Indonesian regime.
The commercial interests of a highly-subsidised industrial sector
appear to have overridden the governments ethical and development
policies, revealing an enduring contradiction within UK foreign
policy, at least as reflected in policies towards Indonesia.
In September 1998 the Indonesian government admitted that,
because of its financial problems, it could not repay the debt for
the Hawks. In February 1998, Margaret Beckett, then President of the
Board of Trade, stated that the 1996 Hawk deal had been guaranteed
by the Export Credits Guarantee Department to the tune of £280m,
which represented 87% of the value of ECGD support for military
exports for Indonesia in 1995-6. This sum had risen with interest to
£362m in February 1999. Like the Hawk deal, the Alvis vehicles were
covered by ECGD to the tune of £65m in 1996 and £2.1m in 1997.
Given the instability and continuing economic problems in
Indonesia, it is not impossible that the taxpayer might have to
cover all of the loan guarantees for arms, an amount of money which
could be spent on more socially useful purposes such as humanitarian
and development aid for the beleaguered Indonesian population.
South Africa is a middle income country with a population of 41
million (1996) and a GNP per capita of $3,160. Twenty five percent
of the population lives in extreme poverty. Extreme income
inequality and the great differences in human development indicators
between different racial groups are a visible legacy of the
apartheid regime.
In April 1994 South Africa held its first democratic election,
marking the end of the highly repressive apartheid regime. From the
outset, popular expectations of the South African economy were high,
but the prognosis is not optimistic. Given a growth rate of 1.7%, a
population growth of 1.7% and roughly 50% of the labour unemployed,
declining export performance, a devalued currency and a rising debt
burden to export ratio, the potential for redistributing wealth to
overcome the inequalities of the past are limited.63
Key Economic Indicators |
1976 |
1986 |
1996 |
1997 |
GDP, $bn |
34.5 |
62.7 |
126.2 |
129.0 |
GDP, % growth |
2.3 |
1.1 |
3.2 |
1.7 |
Exports/GDP |
28.3 |
31.8 |
27.5 |
27.8 |
Current account balance/GDP |
-5.5 |
5.0 |
-1.6 |
-1.5 |
Interest payments/GDP |
? |
? |
0.7 |
0.6 |
Total debt/GDP |
? |
? |
20.6 |
19.5 |
Total debt service/exports |
? |
? |
11.1 |
1.5 |
|
Population, millions |
38.4 |
GNP per capita, $ |
3,400 |
Population growth, annual % |
1.7 |
Life expectancy at birth |
65 |
Infant mortality per 1,000 live births |
48 |
Child malnutrition, % children under 5 |
9 |
Illiteracy, % of population age 15+ |
18 |
|
Since 1994 the government has made considerable headway in
refocusing public expenditures and social policies into development
priorities. Substantial cuts were made in military expenditures and
measures were taken to consolidate a ‘peace dividend’ from military
savings in order to enhance the country’s development
goals64: Between 1994-96 some R1.2bn (£240m) was
reallocated from the defence budget to the Reconstruction and
Development Programme (RDP).65
The RDP was a transition strategy designed to remove the
structural legacies of apartheid. Its key strategies included
meeting basic needs through land reform, housing provision, the
supply of clean water, sanitation and electricity to homes,
investment in public transport and infrastructure, developing human
resources by improving the black education system and diversifying
the economy away from the production of primary commodities such as
agricultural goods and minerals into higher value added
manufacturing.66
The RDP was a carefully articulated social and political
programme designed to redress the inequalities of apartheid. It was
designed to meet the high expectations of South Africa’s
impoverished black population and to enhance their economic
security. In this respect the South African government had a clear
perception of the relationship between security and sustainable
development. The 1996 White Paper on Defence argued that ‘The RDP is
the principal long-term means of promoting the well-being and
security of citizens and, thereby, the stability of the country.
There is consequently a compelling need to reallocate state resource
to the RDP.’67 Mounting macro-economic pressures,
however, forced the government to abandon the RDP in 1996. It was
replaced by the Growth Employment And Redistribution (GEAR) strategy
which represented a less interventionist and more orthodox approach
to macro-economic management. The adoption of GEAR appears to have
to put an end to the development and redistribution aspirations of
the government.
Economic constraints and pressing development needs combined with
the high expectations of the black majority do not augur well for
internal stability. Endemic problems such as the Aids pandemic,
persistent poverty, unemployment, corruption, criminal violence and
the proliferation of small arms make it evident that stability in
South Africa is highly fragile. Already the security forces are
preoccupied with what some have described as a ‘low level civil war
situation’ in KwaZulu-Natal. Furthermore, internal troop deployments
have been made in support of the South African Police’s struggle
against mounting violent crime. The scale of criminal activity in
South Africa has got to a point where it seriously inhibits foreign
direct investors. In South Africa, crime is popularly referred to as
‘redistribution by other means’ and is seen in some quarters as a
reflection of the South African government’s inability to address
the inequities within the South African society.
The UK government provides support to the South African
government’s development priorities via DfID’s bilateral aid
programme which promotes:
- pro-poor investment for sustainable job creation and income
generation
- improvements in the effectiveness of the Government in
delivering essential health, education, water and sanitation
services to the poor
- support for sustainable rural livelihoods and initiatives with
direct benefit to poor people68
In 1998/99 DfID spent £26m on bilateral assistance for
development programmes in South Africa.69 Planned
development expenditures for 1999/00 - 2001/02 are estimated at £30m
per annum.
At the same time that DfID has been working with the South
African government to promote development programmes, the UK
government has relentlessly pursued arms sales to South Africa on
behalf of UK companies.
Despite South Africa’s urgent development needs and chronic
problems of poverty and crime, in January 1999 Deputy Prime Minister
Thabo Mbeki announced the cabinet’s provisional approval of the
decision to re-equip the South African National Defence Force
(SANDF). The items to be procured include;
- 28 Gripen fighters from BAe/SAAB for £1.09bn
- 24 Hawks trainer fighters from BAe for £470m
- 4 corvettes-class patrol boats from a German shipbuilding
consortium
- 3 diesel submarines from the German submarine consortium
- 4 super Lynx helicopters from GKN-Westland
- 40 light helicopters from the Italian firm Agusta in which
GKN-Westland has a stake
The total programme is valued at £3bn or R29bn, to be spread over
fifteen years. Because of budgetary constraints the lead in times
are very long. The warships and their helicopters are due to be
delivered by 2002-04, the submarines by 2004-06, the light
helicopters by 2003-07, the Hawks by 2007-09, the Gripens not until
2009-14. The costs, spread over fifteen years, will amount to an
extra £200m (or R2bn) per annum, representing a 20% increase in the
military budget.
The Cabinet has agreed to this increase despite otherwise tight
monetary and fiscal policies because of the prospects of easy
finance via a soft loan on which no payment is to be made until 2001
and the generous offset deals procured from foreign suppliers.
Currently the South African government insists on 80% offsets on all
military imports, but has set a target of 100% for these specific
deals, of which 50% will involve investment in the local military
industry and 50% will be invested in civil industry. In total the
South African government has insisted on a total investment worth
£10bn which it hopes will create 65,000 jobs.
While South Africa is in desperate need of employment generation,
given an unemployment rate of over 50% within the black townships,
the sort of jobs that direct offsets are likely to generate within
the military industry will predominantly be for the white skilled
workforce that face far less hardships than the black labour force.
In justification of the programme, the South African government
has claimed that it will enable South Africa to be the policeman of
sub-Saharan Africa. Certainly this is a role that foreign powers
have been nurturing South Africa for. But within the Southern
African region, South Africa’s rearmament can only be viewed with
consternation. Regional security co-operation via Southern African
Development Community (SADC) is at an all time low due to the
fundamental differences over policies towards the war in the
Democratic Republic of Congo. Moreover, the general remilitarisation
of the region, reflected in rising military expenditures, and a
general trend towards rearmament suggests that foreign suppliers
should err on the side of caution if such early warning signs are to
be heeded seriously.
In securing a sizeable proportion of the rearmament programme
Tony Blair has promised £4bn worth of investments linked to the UK
component of the arms deal. The deal is also likely to increase
South Africa’s debt burden. Although the UK companies involved are
expected to provide the offset investments, export credit guarantees
will undoubtedly be supplied to underwrite the risks being taken by
UK firms involved in the deal. The weighting of UK resources towards
facilitating a controversial arms deal, in contrast with the
resources made available for development purposes, raises some
uncomfortable ethical questions about UK priorities towards South
Africa.
To all intents and purposes it undermines DfID’s attempts to
restrict arms flows and reduce weapons proliferation in the Southern
African region. At the same time it exacerbates the regional
‘security dilemma’ by enhancing South Africa’s military power
projection capabilities and effectively increasing the sense of
insecurity of neighbouring states. Indirectly this may further
undermine regional security co-operation via SADC.
At a time when South Africa is clearly facing economic
difficulties which may have serious implications for internal
political stability, and when the region is undergoing an alarming
process of remilitarisation which is enhancing the role of the
military vis a vis civil society within the region, UK priorities
towards South Africa appear very short-sighted and highly
contradictory.
Conclusion
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If the UK is to champion development concerns in international
forums, it needs to re-examine the current anomalies within its own
national practice.70 Selling weapons to countries facing
acute development and debt problems contradicts the government’s
goal of reducing global poverty, enhancing development and
preventing conflict.
Scarce national resources used to purchase weapons invariable
imply an opportunity cost to development. In highly indebted
countries, particularly those that have official HIPC status, arms
transfers are unethical, not only because of the missed opportunity
for development, which in very poor countries translates into poor
quality of life and in some cases loss of life, but also because
many of these countries are conflict prone as a result of the
systemic problems of poverty and inequality. As witnessed in
Indonesia, growing food insecurity has resulted in protest and riots
in which the military have indiscriminately turned their weapons on
unarmed civilians.
Kofi Annan in his Report on Africa to the United Nations Security
Council stated that
‘Arms exporting countries have a responsibility to exercise
restraint especially with respect to the export of weapons into
zones of conflict or tension’.71 His appeal was made not
only because of humanitarian considerations but also because of the
costs of conflict to development. The withholding of weapons sales
is a powerful political tool which not only sends signals to the
regime concerned, but provides affirmation to the global community
of an ongoing commitment to the universal norms and values which
uphold the indivisible aims of universal human rights and
sustainable development.
The UK’s persistence in selling arms and extending credit to
repressive military or authoritarian regimes in the developing
world, represents a missed opportunity to champion international
norms and values based on human rights and sustainable development.
As a leading developed economy, the UK should foster development for
the whole of humanity and eschew the vested interests of its
national military industrial base. The government’s current arms
sales policy undermines this imperative because arms transfers
contribute to the impoverishment of developing countries and the
burden of unsustainable debt which in turn undermines the security
of developing states and its citizens.
Something is fundamentally wrong with the value system of a
society that places the subsidisation of the arms market higher on
its international agenda than the alleviation of debt and poverty
and the promotion of sustainable development. Overseas development
aid is much more than a hand out to the worlds poor, it is an
essential part of investing in global security.
The current contradictions between the UK’s arms trade policies,
debt and development are likely to persist until there is greater
public accountability in the arms trade decision making process,
which allows civil society a chance to challenge the vested
interests of the military lobby and the Whitehall mandarins. Until
such time, the fundamental dilemma between development and
commercial gain in the UK’s arms trade policies are likely to remain
at odds.
Notes
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Acronyms
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DfID Department for International Development
DTI Department of Trade and Industry ECGD
Export Credits Guarantee Department ECOWAS Economic
Community of West African States EU European Union
FCO Foreign and Commonwealth Office GDP Gross
Domestic Product GNP Gross National Product
GEAR Growth Employment And Redistribution strategy (South
Africa) HIPC Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
IISS International Institute for Strategic Studies
IMF International Monetary Fund KANU Kenya
Africa National Union party MoD Ministry of Defence
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development RDP Reconstruction and Development Programme
(South Africa) RUF Revolutionary Unified Front (Sierra
Leone) SADC Southern African Development Community
SANDF South African National Defence Force
SIPRI Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
UAE United Arab Emirates UNDP United Nations
Development Programme UNICEF United Nations Children’s
Fund | |